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W H E N  A L L  T H E Y  T H O U G H T  WA S  S O L I D 
M E LT E D  I N T O  A I R
Resisting Pauperization in Argentina during the 2002 Crisis
Daniel Ozarow
Middlesex University Business School
Abstract: This article examines the actions that millions of new-poor Argentine citi-
zens took when confronted with impoverishment during the country’s economic crisis 
in 2002. Drawing on World Bank and Latinobarómetro survey data, it explores how 
their distinct understandings of citizenship; their possession of human, social, physi-
cal, cultural, and fi nancial capital; and aspects of their middle-class identity shaped the 
very specifi c forms of resistance that they adopted compared to the structural poor. It 
provides insights into why some citizens perceived their hardship as a political problem, 
formed collective grievances, and manifested their resistance through protest, while oth-
ers located the causes of hardship in their own defi ciencies and tended to confi ne their 
responses to individual self-improvement strategies. It also fi nds that differences in per-
sonal biographies, experiences of poverty, and the changing spaces available to protest 
infl uenced individuals’ choice of action.
One of the most sobering legacies of three decades of neoliberalism in Latin 
America has been the exposure of a signifi cant proportion of its middle class to 
vulnerability and impoverishment. Yet since the conceptualization of new pov-
erty in the early 1990s, these studies have almost exclusively focused on how such 
citizens and households deal with dramatic declines in material well-being in 
terms of their private self-improvement responses to external shocks. Research 
has approached these “coping strategies” from an array of disciplinary perspec-
tives including analyses of psychological (Masseroni and Sauane 2002), cultural 
and civic (Minujín 2008), and consumer-based responses (Zurawicki and Braidot 
2005). Others have examined the comparative advantages in terms of gaining 
work or pursuing self-employment opportunities that the new poor enjoy over 
the structurally poor (the long-term impoverished who possess few resources and 
little political or social power) due to their prior accumulation of superior social 
and cultural capital (Feijóo 2003). Notable studies have identifi ed distinctive new-
poor responses to government social policies (Aguirre 2008), and counterrational 
behaviors in seeking symbolic capital to preserve their class identity and loss of 
status (Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008; Ozarow 2008). Yet in this body of work, the 
political dimension of pauperization and how it is resisted by the middle class 
through collective behavior and protest actions (especially during periods of eco-
My gratitude is due to Leandro Sepulveda, Richard Croucher, and Sarah Bradshaw for their assis-
tance with this article; to Middlesex University Business School for funding this research; and to the 
three anonymous LARR reviewers for their helpful comments. All errors that remain are the author’s 
responsibility.
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nomic crisis) has been largely neglected (Richards and Gelleny 2006). I argue that 
impoverished citizens can also be understood as political agents.
One has only to look at Latin America’s recent history to realize that many 
newly poor citizens do not simply resign themselves to their deteriorating eco-
nomic circumstances by adopting coping strategies alone. For example, after sev-
eral years of crisis in Venezuela during the 1980s, when structural adjustments 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed hundreds of thou-
sands into poverty, many responded by participating in a wave of roadblocks, 
building occupations, and other collective protest actions that culminated in the 
1989 Caracazo (López-Maya 2002). Meanwhile, Uruguay’s new poor were at the 
forefront of its protest movement during the country’s economic crisis in 2003.1 
In this article I draw on evidence from Argentina in 2002 to examine how the 
country’s estimated 7.3 million largely well-educated and affl uent citizens who 
became poor during its economic crisis (INDEC EPH Survey, 2003) resisted their 
hardship.2 First, I ask what diachronic factors help to explain why citizens in this 
stratum demonstrated a growing tendency to join collective actions by 2002 but a 
greater inclination for private coping strategies in the 1990s (Svampa 2005). Sec-
ond, I explore why some individuals and households participated in the numer-
ous collective actions that erupted around the country in the months that fol-
lowed the popular uprisings of December 19 and 20, 2001, while others restricted 
their strategies to the realm of private self-improvement.
Very few studies have concentrated on how Latin American households that 
become impoverished but are not structurally poor respond to economic adver-
sity. These studies tend to scrutinize the actions of what they loosely defi ne as 
the “middle class.” In contrast, this article takes the view that it is precisely the 
diversity of this social class that makes the nuanced responses of different sectors 
within it (like the new poor) so intriguing. Mazzoni’s (2007) study on the impact 
of pauperization on citizens’ political beliefs in the Patagonian city of General 
Roca in the period following Argentina’s crisis provides a rare and valuable ex-
ception. This article seeks to build on Mazzoni’s research by exploring not just 
how impoverishment affected political attitudes but also the collective and pri-
vate behaviors that those in this new-poor stratum enacted in response.
In order to consolidate and frame existing qualitative research in this fi eld, I 
conduct a wide-ranging quantitative study that demarcates new-poor responses to 
the economic crisis from those of other strata. Statistical analyses that seek to do 
this have until now been absent due to the diffi culty of using surveys to identify 
those households that can be assigned to a new-poor stratum (as originally con-
ceptualized in Minujín, Beccaria, and Bustelo 1993), as well as by the scarcity of 
data that incorporates both protest and self-help responses to economic crisis. An 
analysis of secondary data from the World Bank’s (2002) Impact of the Social Crisis 
on Argentina (ISCA) household survey permits this endeavor.
1. “El Prado se llenó ayer de protestas contra el gobierno,” La República, September 15, 2003.
2. INDEC, Microdatos de la Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), Año 2003, www.indec.gov.ar; 
Ismael Bermúdez, “Ya son 21 millones los pobres en la Argentina,” Clarín.com, January 1, 2003, http://
old.clarin.com/diario/2003/01/05/e-01701.htm.
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IMPOVERISHMENT, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION, AND PROTEST
Research on new poverty has been driven by a legitimate concern that national 
governments, international fi nancial institutions (IFIs), and nongovernmental in-
stitutions (NGOs) have dedicated their efforts to confronting structural poverty 
while neglecting policy initiatives that specifi cally support the new poor (or those 
vulnerable to becoming poor) (Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008). This research has 
tended to view such citizens solely as benefi t-maximizing economic actors in 
terms of how they resist their hardship. Yet this assumption of rational choice has 
been criticized as atomistic and overly individualistic (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996), 
because in reality individual actions are shaped by the structural forces that both 
create and restrict the spaces available to act (so actions are not freely chosen). Such 
approaches also discount the possibility that impoverished citizens may develop 
a sense of shared identity, forge collective grievances with others who have also 
become poor, or recognize the power that solidarity and collective action could 
have in resisting their social descent (Tajfel and Turner 1986). When this happens, 
their political demands are typically expressed through collective protests to gov-
ernment, judicial, and fi nancial authorities (Lipsky 1968). Therefore, in order to 
fully understand the impact of the Washington Consensus3 and economic crisis 
in Latin America, it is necessary to acknowledge that economic processes cannot 
be divorced from their social and political consequences. Economic strategies of 
resistance must be analyzed alongside political resistance and protest.
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ARGENTINA
The new poor became a prominent feature of Latin America’s socioeconomic 
landscape during the 1980s and 1990s, when in the wake of the debt crisis, and 
often as a condition of new IMF loans, many of the region’s national governments 
began to replace their traditional import substitution industrialization develop-
ment models with neoliberalism. The structural adjustment policies that they 
implemented led to a tide of privatizations, reductions in state welfare, increases 
in value-added taxes, and an erosion of trade union power (Minujín, Beccaria, 
and Bustelo 1993). With some national variations, these squeezed Latin America’s 
middle class. The region’s unemployment rate consequently rose from 5.8 percent 
to 8.7 percent between 1990 and 1999.4
As quality of life deteriorated for millions, the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) declared that existing understandings of 
poverty were no longer adequate because the profi le of the region’s poor was be-
3. The Washington Consensus refers to the package of economic policies advocated by the US gov-
ernment, the IMF, and the World Bank and introduced in Argentina and the rest of Latin America dur-
ing the 1990s. While these policies aimed to foster macroeconomic stabilization, trade and investment, 
and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy, they also contributed to rising social 
problems such as unemployment and vulnerability by removing state welfare and labour protections.
4. CEPALSTAT Base de Datos, http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp (accessed Sep-
tember 9, 2013).
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coming increasingly heterogeneous (Katzman 1989). In 1993, Alberto Minujín and 
his colleagues developed this notion further by describing how a “new poor” 
social stratum had emerged in the region. Their conceptualization provided a 
welcome effort to construct a more comprehensive analysis of the increasingly 
complex nature of Latin American poverty. It understood that in spite of their 
present states of unemployment, low salaries, or low-skilled jobs, these citizens 
not only had their basic needs provided for but also had inherited distinct life 
histories; superior human, social, and cultural capital; and middle-class values 
and identities from their non-poor pasts. These characteristics meant that they 
behaved differently than the structural poor in terms of the self-improvement 
strategies that they enacted under conditions of economic hardship (Kessler and 
Di Virgilio 2008). This article contends that these features also infl uenced their 
distinctive protest behaviors.
Historically, Argentina boasted one of the most sizable middle classes in Latin 
America (Portes and Hoffman 2003) following several waves of European immi-
gration in the early twentieth century. This class thrived under import substitu-
tion industrialization and benefi ted from the unusually accessible higher educa-
tion and welfare systems that were developed under Peronism in the 1940s and 
1950s. Given its unusually large middle class, Argentina has been particularly 
susceptible to a reversal of upward social mobility in comparison to other Latin 
American societies and has experienced three severe waves of new poverty in the 
last thirty years (Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008). In the 1980s the military junta’s 
public-sector wage freeze caused salaries to plummet by 40 percent, sparking the 
fi rst wave. Then, during the 1990s, President Carlos Menem’s structural adjust-
ment policies fragmented the middle class (Kessler 2003) and provoked an incre-
mental rise in (unemployment-induced) poverty. However, Argentina’s third and 
most tumultuous episode of new poverty was spawned by the economic crisis of 
2001–2002. A sequence of events including the government defaulting on most of 
its US$132 billion debt and the consequent devaluation of the peso, a collapse in 
internal demand, the closure of thousands of businesses, and the subsequent loss 
of skilled jobs aggravated offi cial unemployment, which soared to 22 percent by 
October 2002. Meanwhile, 54 percent of citizens found themselves below the pov-
erty line (INDEC 2003), most of whom had previously lived comfortable lifestyles; 
Argentina’s middle class was almost extinguished overnight. Further, an acute 
credit shortage followed as the banks confi scated savers’ withdrawals as a result 
of an emergency government decree called the corralito, which aimed to prevent 
further capital fl ight. This policy removed an important safety net against vulner-
ability for millions of middle-class savers.
Although new poverty is largely a temporary and cyclical phenomenon from 
which citizens are eventually largely reabsorbed into the labor market, about a 
million of those who were pauperized during the 2001–2002 crisis remain income-
impoverished today, in spite of the macroeconomic recovery since 2003.5
5. Guillermo Bertoldi, “La Argentina modelo 2009,” March 6, 2009, slide 4, http://www.slideshare
.net/guillermobertoldi/argentina-modelo-2009-1110075 (accessed November 14, 2011).
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NEW-POOR RESPONSES: BETWEEN SELF-HELP AND PROTEST
Various sources have explored individual motivations for involvement in par-
ticular collective actions during Argentina’s economic crisis in 2002. These actions 
include barter clubs (Bombal and Luzzi 2006); neighborhood assemblies (Svampa 
and Corral 2006); worker-recovered enterprises (Paiva 2004), when following the 
bankruptcy of a number of companies during the crisis, thousands of workers 
occupied their factories and offi ces and recommenced production without their 
bosses; cacerolazos, a popular form of protest in Argentina involving the banging 
of pots and pans (Briones and Mendoza 2003); and bank customers’ escrache pro-
tests outside the banks that had confi scated deposits during the corralito (Svampa 
2008). However, no study has scrutinized the motivations of newly impoverished 
participants in particular or sought to understand how hardship or a loss of so-
cial status affected their subjectivities, and how this sometimes induced politi-
cized responses or collective forms of action. Having synthesized the literature 
on diachronically fl uctuating middle-class political mobilization since the 1990s 
and sources that discuss individual involvement in particular actions to establish 
propositions about generative infl uences on new-poor collective action during the 
2002 economic crisis, I identify three interrelated motivations: (1) the opportu-
nities approach (supply/accessibility of actions); (2) subjectivities and collective 
identity arguments; and (3) political attitudes, economic need motivations, and 
tolerance of poverty debates. I divide these into “in-group considerations” (ex-
planations for the increased tendency for the new poor to participate in collective 
actions in 2002 as a social stratum) and “private considerations” (why certain indi-
viduals engaged in such actions during the economic crisis and others did not).
In-Group Considerations in 2002
Growing opportunities for involvement in collective action / A study of 5,268 collec-
tive protests in Argentina between 1989 and 2003 indicates that the average an-
nual number of protest actions was actually higher during the 1990s than during 
the crisis years of 2000–2003 (Schuster et al. 2006). Paradoxically, a plethora of 
qualitative research portrays an unprecedented level of protest by the middle sec-
tors (which include the new poor) during this latter period (Adamovsky 2009; 
Svampa and Corral 2006), as well as their widespread participation in collective 
self-help initiatives. Longitudinal quantitative data that breaks down involvement 
in collective actions by class or social strata does not exist; however, we can infer 
that new-poor collective and protest activity increased during the crisis based on 
the proliferation of collective actions like the cacerolazos and neighborhood as-
semblies, which were construed as new methods of manifesting dissent that were 
suffi ciently distinct from the traditional forms used by the working class and the 
structural poor. This allowed those in the middle sectors to engage in contentious 
actions while also reasserting their middle-class identity and restoring its impor-
tant role on the national political scene (Svampa and Corral 2006). For example, 
the number of cacerolazo protests exploded from a nominal pre-December 2001 
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fi gure to 2,014 in the fi rst three months of 2002 alone. Further, although barely 
any permanent popular or neighborhood assemblies existed before 2001, 277 were 
established in 2002 (Nueva Mayoría 2006). Middle-class savers’ escrache protests 
also became widespread that year (Svampa 2008). Similarly, the number of barter 
clubs soared from half a dozen in 1995 (totaling several hundred participants) to 
500 clubs (400,000 participants) in 2000, to 4,500 clubs (2.6 million participants) in 
2002 (Bombal and Luzzi 2006). This can be attributed largely to contingent factors 
like the shortage of liquidity after the corralito and sovereign debt default.
These fi gures suggest that opportunities to join collective actions during 2002 
were vastly greater compared to the 1990s; this increase may have fostered a 
higher rate of new-poor involvement in them.
Scale of the crisis, severity of economic need, and an emerging new-poor collective iden-
tity / Such was the relative scale and profundity of the 2002 crisis that the sense 
of shared crisis was far more evident than in the previous decade. Poverty shot up 
from 35 percent in October 2001 to 54 percent in May 2002, whereas it grew only 
slowly in the 1990s, from about 20 percent to 30 percent over ten years (INDEC 
2003). This may have helped newly poor Argentines to understand their diffi cul-
ties as part of a broader structural problem in 2001–2002, as did the systematic cri-
tique of neoliberalism’s fl aws that began to penetrate the media, popular culture, 
and academia (Grimson and Kessler 2005). Mass pauperization also cultivated 
the development of a collective identity of “shared frustrated hopes” between 
neighbors and acquaintances, as Mazzoni (2007) observed among General Roca’s 
new poor. The stigma associated with middle-class impoverishment, which had 
restricted community-based responses in the prior decade, withered away, and a 
climate of resistance emerged during the “extraordinary year” of 2002 (Svampa 
2005) that fostered collective solutions to the country’s problems.
Hardship was also experienced more intensely in 2002 following the credit 
shortage, post-default currency devaluation, high infl ation, and the seizure of sav-
ings in the corralito. This was unlike the 1990s, when a favorable macroeconomic 
context meant that impoverishment tended to be understood as a temporary state 
that would be resolved when suitable employment opportunities became avail-
able (Minujín, Beccaria, and Bustelo 1993). Profound fi nancial need coupled with 
the apocalyptic economic scenario of 2002 made many despair (Briones and Men-
doza 2003), and so for many, the perceived permanence of their fall called into 
question the validity of their very membership in the middle class (Grimson and 
Kessler 2005). This increased their inclination to respond more radically because 
they had relatively less to lose than the new-poor cohort of the previous decade.
Further, in light of the Lost Decade of the 1980s, the 1990s new poor perhaps 
expected relatively less than their 2002 peers, both materially for themselves, and 
of their government. In contrast, in 2001–2002, middle-class Argentines had not 
only enjoyed the prolonged economic boom of the 1990s but had also grown used 
to exceptionally high living standards under Convertibility, whereby the value 
of the Argentine peso had been artifi cially pegged to the US dollar since 1991. 
When these infl ated expectations were suddenly frustrated during the onset of 
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the crisis, this “relative poverty”—the disparity between raised hopes but declin-
ing material conditions that J-Curve Theory (Davies 1971) postulates—may help 
to explain the outbreak of social unrest among the new poor in 2002.
Crisis of political legitimacy and reduced tolerance of hardship / In seeking to account 
for increasingly politicized and collective behaviors among the struggling middle 
class in 2002, the macroeconomic and political contexts in which their actions 
were situated help to explain the extent to which pauperization or social descent 
was politically tolerated. In the 1990s, impoverishment occurred amid an atmo-
sphere of macroeconomic prosperity and perceived societal enrichment. Infl a-
tion had fallen from 4,900 percent in 1989 to single digits by the mid-1990s, and 
growth of between 4 and 10 percent was achieved every year between 1991 and 
1998 with the exception of 1995.6 Many in this second wave of new poverty in the 
1990s therefore credited the national government with prudent management of 
the country’s economy and therefore tolerated their personal hardship and were 
more inclined to internalize the reasons for it. The relative availability of work in 
the 1990s (only 29 percent of Argentines found themselves either underemployed 
or unemployed even at the worst point of the 1990s, whereas this fi gure hit 40 per-
cent during 2002 [INDEC 2003]), and the fact that the national government, mass 
media, and many cultural outlets actively propagated the ascendant neoliberal 
values of self-reliance, entrepreneurship, and responsibility for one’s successes 
and failures, produced a general retreat into private coping strategies in the 1990s 
(Svampa 2005).
However, by 2002 the national picture had been transformed. Argentina had 
been in recession for three years, and disillusionment with the political system 
was escalating, not only due to politicians’ inability to save the country from its 
most serious economic collapse in history, or the paralysis in the state legislature 
after the October 2001 election, but also following a catalog of political scandals 
(for example in 2000 it was revealed that a large number of senators had been 
bribed to pass the Labor Reform Bill), which added to the impression that the 
political establishment was corrupt and self-serving. This precipitated a crisis of 
legitimacy that was magnifi ed among those in the struggling middle class who 
had more sophisticated notions of political citizenship and acceptable conduct 
(Mazzoni 2007). The middle class also felt politically abandoned due to their es-
trangement from the institutions that had traditionally represented them, like the 
Radical Party (Lupu and Stokes 2009). This left them without an electoral outlet 
to express their dissatisfaction at their own social descent. Further, in terms of 
the trade union confederations, while the Argentine Worker’s Congress (CTA, 
Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina) had helped to mobilize some newly im-
poverished sectors, it struggled to keep pace with the radicalism of 2002 and was 
rendered incapable of fi lling the void of representation (Svampa 2006). Meanwhile 
the Peronist-controlled Workers’ Confederation (CGT, Confederación General de 
Trabajo) was understood by many to be part of the old exhausted system. Con-
tingent events like the corralito or President Fernando de la Rúa’s declaration of 
6. CEPALSTAT Base de Datos.
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a state of siege on December 19, 2001, undoubtedly increased the likelihood that 
Argentines would absolve themselves of responsibility for their own hardship 
and instead attribute it to specifi c government or IMF policies. For many, this 
consequently raised the prospect of a protest response.
Finally, the collapse of the Convertibility model after the sovereign debt default 
in early 2002 also infl uenced middle-class political behavior during the crisis. 
Under the policy during the 1990s, Argentines had been endowed with unprec-
edented purchasing power due to the cheap prices of imports, low cost of borrow-
ing, and sudden availability of credit. The fact that so many were rapidly able to 
imitate the consumption patterns of the European and North American middle 
classes created the illusion that Argentina had fi nally “joined the First World.” 
This achievement was equated with the fulfi llment of Argentina’s national des-
tiny of “grandeur,” which had been promised since European immigrants had 
fi rst been enticed to Argentine shores in the late nineteenth century (Armony and 
Armony 2005). Millions confl ated their newfound luxury spending habits with 
the achievement of upward social mobility and membership in the middle class. 
This added to the general sense of affl uence that further atomized opposition to 
the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s and deterred those who did become poor at 
the time from politically resisting their fate. When Convertibility crumbled in 
2002 and many of the luxury imported goods that Argentines had become ac-
customed to suddenly became unaffordable, their belief in all these myths simply 
“melted into air.” The distressing reality that they had been deceived invoked im-
mense anger and distrust in the political establishment, prompting many to take 
to the streets in an attempt to recover their honor.
Continuity in the resistance, 1990s–2002 / Nevertheless, far from completely ac-
quiescing to their descent, diverse elements of the struggling middle sectors were 
also at the forefront of resistance to structural adjustment throughout the 1990s. 
This included small and medium-sized agricultural producers that joined the 
tractorazo protest in 1994, teachers and civil servants who were active in the CTA, 
as well as various business associations that participated in the 1995 general strike 
(Adamovsky 2009). However, while in the 1990s they tended to resist their impov-
erishment as part of the labor movement or through professional associations 
by using traditional forms of protest, by 2002 they did so more consciously as a 
newly pauperized sector of society, and also adopted new and autonomous forms 
of action with horizontal leadership structures that fell outside the institutional-
ized spaces of representative democracy (Adamovsky 2009). In 2002, preferred 
neighborhood-based organizational methods such as assemblies and mass street 
protests were adapted from earlier territorialized “repertoires of protest” (Tilly 
2006), such as the 1982 vecinazo uprisings and the 1990s puebladas. Although these 
were relatively new in twentieth-century Argentina, by the beginning of 2000 
they had been incorporated into the repertoires of broad sectors of the population 
and thus became a more naturalized response among the middle class when they 
too faced adverse economic conditions. In these senses, the 2001–2002 scenario 
should not be considered as a historically distinct period of new-poor collective 
resistance but as an upsurge of the existing one.
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Private Considerations in 2002
Localized opportunities for collective action / Nueva Mayoría data (2006) conveys 
a marked geographical variation in the frequency of permanent neighborhood 
assemblies, cacerolazo protests, and barter clubs that existed among Argentina’s 
provinces in 2002 (table 1). Notwithstanding reliability problems about the accu-
rate recording of all possible actions, and not accounting for regional differences 
in transport, infrastructure, terrain, or distance to population hubs, the fi gures 
suggest the ease with which actions could be located and joined in proximity to 
one’s locality.
The data unequivocally posits the city of Buenos Aires as the district with the 
greatest concentration of actions. It boasted 41 percent of the neighborhood as-
semblies and 26 percent of the cacerolazo protests, despite containing only 7 per-
cent of the national population. Its residents also had the shortest average distance 
to travel in order to take part in collective actions (just 200 meters). Buenos Aires 
Province was the location of a vastly disproportionate number of barter clubs 
(60 percent of the total national fi gure) and offered relatively close physical prox-
imity to collective actions, as did Santa Fe Province. On this basis, the hypothesis 
emerges that newly impoverished Argentines would have been more likely to join 
collective actions if they lived in these three districts and less inclined to do so in 
the remaining parts of the country.
Tolerance and tangibility of hardship / An intrinsic relationship between self-help 
and protest actions may also be documented. With reference to Argentina, Pow-
ers (1999) argues that material concerns become understood as a political prob-
lem when personal tolerance of pauperization declines. Such situations may arise 
when citizens are either unable to fi nd suffi cient economic coping mechanisms 
to satisfy their needs (if these mechanisms are undermined or are unsuccessful) 
or if one’s poverty is experienced more intensely (thus invoking anger and less 
rational responses). When economic aspirations continue to be frustrated or life-
style sacrifi ces move beyond the realms of acceptability, citizens begin to examine 
the structural reasons for their descent, excuse themselves of culpability for their 
hardship, and channel their demands politically. From this background the fol-
lowing propositions can be formulated. Individuals were more likely to resort 
to protest who were either (1) unable to secure adequate employment or other 
private income sources, (2) experienced higher income losses, or (3) had prior ex-
perience of political activism.
DATA AND METHODS
Survey Instruments and Research Objectives
Research draws on survey data from two secondary sources. The fi rst, the 
World Bank–commissioned ISCA national household survey, covered 9,209 in-
dividuals (6,531 adults) in 2,800 households in 2002. It was stratifi ed by both city 
size and region for urban areas according to census data so is representative of 
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the heterogeneity of the country’s urban new poor, although the survey was not 
large enough to accurately represent Argentina’s rural population. Conducted 
by an Argentine market research fi rm, OPSM (Opinión Pública, Servicios y Mer-
cados), the objective was to understand how households survived the country’s 
economic crisis and how it affected their members’ well-being. For the purposes 
of this article, the original data set was used in several ways: (1) to identify what 
forms of resistance were employed by Argentines who became impoverished 
during the crisis; (2) to observe how their modes of resistance differed from those 
of the structural poor by analyzing the effects that their possession of certain 
middle-class characteristics (like superior capital assets and notions of identity) 
had on their responses; and (3) to examine how individuals’ choice of action was 
affected by differences in their experiences of poverty, biographical histories, and 
labor market position. In order to understand the social attitudes and political 
perspectives that informed these actions, data was triangulated by referencing a 
second public opinion survey from the same year (Latinobarómetro 2002). This 
additional data helped to discover how the new poor felt about their own hard-
ship, the degree to which they were prepared to politically tolerate it, and the 
extent to which they felt that self-help opportunities existed to aid their emer-
gence from poverty. Latinobarómetro survey results from 1995 (Argentina’s only 
year of recession in the 1990s) were also consulted to observe how newly poor 
Argentines’ opinions changed between a year of economic downturn during that 
decade and 2002. Examining how their attitudes evolved over time helps us to 
understand the diachronic fl uctuations in the actions that they took when con-
fronted with poverty.
Sampling Procedure and Data Limitations
The ISCA Survey’s participants completed a closed questionnaire once during 
May/June 2002 and again during October/November 2002. Its two data collection 
rounds enabled a stratifi ed sample of the new poor to be obtained by fi rst attaining 
a sample of all those individual adults who lived in households that had offi cially 
become “income poor” (whose monthly per capita income fell below $232 pesos 
or US$2 dollars per day) during the six months between data collection rounds. 
Due to the high proportion of household income that is generated from informal 
work in Argentina (45.1 percent of all jobs in 2002 were informal, INDEC 2003), 
the survey measured income that was derived from both monetary practices like 
formally or informally waged work and also nonmonetary arrangements such as 
barter credits, food vouchers, or income received in any of the conglomeration of 
parallel currencies that were in circulation at the time.
The fi nal new-poor sample included only those individuals who also pos-
sessed the qualitative “basic needs” characteristics that Minujín, Beccaria, and 
Bustelo (1993) described in their conceptualization of new poverty, namely ad-
equate housing conditions (that is, residence in a house or apartment rather than 
in a shantytown or other precarious forms of habitation); access to electricity 
and running water; and a high level of education (completed secondary school 
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or more). Using these criteria reduced the number of cases to 314.7 In this way 
the impact of impoverishment on action could be determined by comparing pre- 
and post-pauperization responses. The small sample size may make the results 
susceptible to a type-II error (by which the null hypothesis is falsely accepted), 
and so creates an underreporting of signifi cant test results. While this important 
data limitation is acknowledged, attempts were made to mitigate it by measur-
ing the outcomes at 90 percent (rather than 95 percent) confi dence levels (Verrill 
and Durst 2005). Further, an important methodological point should be stressed 
here. Given both the theoretical social, economic, and geographic heterogeneity of 
new poverty and the actual demographic diversity of the survey sample, any sta-
tistically signifi cant test results that explain the actions of particular subgroups 
should not be interpreted as absolute and fully generalizable to the entire urban 
new-poor population but rather understood as merely behavioral tendencies that 
were manifested by this stratum at that particular moment in Argentine history.
An additional issue was that ISCA recorded only formal responses. Thus im-
portant but often illegal or informal activities like looting, criminality, or graffi ti 
were omitted. Also, the selection of variables to test was prejudiced by the origi-
nal survey authors’ understandings of what categories are important in explain-
ing behavior, which may have confl icted with those that mattered most to the 
survey participants themselves.
In terms of Latinobarómetro, this survey was representative of the national 
population across gender, socioeconomic status, and age. Its participants also 
completed closed questionnaires and were requested to refl ect on the extent to 
which they agreed with a series of statements about politics, institutions, eco-
nomic models, and so on. This survey did not record income data, so only those 
participants who subjectively perceived that their economic circumstances had 
declined (and who possessed the same three biographical characteristics: ade-
quate housing conditions, access to utilities, and high education levels) were in-
cluded in the new-poor sample. The opinions of those in this sample are therefore 
only indicative of those of that which was obtained from the ISCA survey. Of 
the 1,200 adults in the original Latinobarómetro survey, the new-poor sample in-
cluded 202 cases in 2002 (17 percent of the sample universe) and 124 cases in 1995 
(10 percent).
Classifying Responses
Motivations for participation in any particular self-help or protest action can 
be multidimensional and driven by self-interest, altruism, idealism, or collective 
concerns. However, in this paper the responses have been categorized in accor-
dance with how they were described by the ISCA Survey’s designers (see table 2). 
7. It is important to note that while this constitutes 4.8 percent of the adult population in the survey 
universe, it represents an equivalent of two million Argentines who became poor between May and 
October 2002. This fi gure closely matches INDEC’s own estimated 4.6 percent increase in the numbers 
who became poor during the same time frame, which suggests that the heterogeneity of the new-poor 
population at the time is accurately refl ected in the new-poor sample that is the focus of this research.
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Data on voting behavior was obtained separately from Latinobarómetro. Actions 
are regarded as “collective” if they involved a “joint commitment” by multiple 
households to a single outcome, in which each played their part in making it hap-
pen. Cases in which single households pursued their particular goals indepen-
dently of others (receipt of state aid, for example) are deemed to be individual 
responses. These usually occurred in physical isolation (like an offi ce or voting 
booth) and could be performed regardless of others’ involvement. While the ul-
timate goal of protest is usually some kind of self-improvement, responses are 
classifi ed as the latter here only if they sought immediate material enrichment. If 
the desired improvement needed to traverse a political stage through the process 
of “demand-making” to some kind of authority, then they were deemed to be 
protests.
SURVEY RESULTS
Forms of Resistance
In the face of economic hardship, individual household-level strategies were 
the most freely used response and were employed by all those in the new-poor 
sample. Collective action was less commonly undertaken, having been pur-
sued by 28.3 percent; and while 12.4 percent joined collective self-help activities, 
20.1 percent engaged in collective protests (some survey participants took part 
in both). Local actions—such as those at community job centers, barter clubs, or 
neighborhood assemblies—proved more popular than actions that adopted a na-
tional focus. Based on these results, fi gure 1 illustrates how the new poor orga-
nized their resistance.
It was especially interesting to observe how the modes of organization the new 
Table 2 Classifi cation of different response actions in Argentina during 2002
Response category Indicators of action
Individual self-improvement Work, self-employment, rent/dividends, gifts, 
redundancy pay, pension, charity, exchanging 
goods, buying on trust, friend/family loan, bank 
loan, savings, credit, sale/pawn of assets, cartonero 
(waste collecting), state aid, nonstate aid, other
Collective self-improvement School soup kitchen, community soup kitchen, 
communal purchasing, barter clubs, bric-a-bracs, 
cooperative business, neighborhood job center, 
community fund-raising, babysitting, public wel-
fare lobbying, public works, communal squatting, 
communal security, other
Individual protest Voting
Collective protest Cacerolazos, strikes, neighborhood assemblies, 
pickets, demonstrations, public meetings, church/
social group protests, other 
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poor adopted compared to those of their structurally poor counterparts. Newly 
impoverished Argentines were almost twice as likely to participate in collective 
actions (either self-improvement or protest), with 28.3 percent doing so compared 
to 15.1 percent of the structural poor (p = .00). The reasons for this cannot be 
explained exhaustively using the survey data alone. However, I suggest three ex-
planations. First, the modes of collective action that blossomed during that era 
tended to be both more attractive and more relevant to the grievances of impover-
ished middle-class citizens. For example, it was the middle class, not the structural 
poor, who lost their savings and so tended to join the escraches of the banks at the 
time (Svampa 2008). Meanwhile, 40 percent of neighborhood assembly members 
were middle class (Nueva Mayoría 2002) because it was a form of resistance that 
particularly appealed to their heightened sense of political citizenship (Mazzoni 
2007). Second, these collective actions tended to take place in urban middle-class 
districts where the new poor resided, rather than in pockets of absolute poverty 
in Argentina’s shantytowns (Svampa and Corral 2006). Furthermore, the new 
poor’s relative abundance of social, human, and fi nancial capital (Kessler and Di 
Virgilio 2008) placed them in a much stronger position to mobilize collectively, 
because they could exploit networks of well-connected contacts to enact such 
solutions.
Finally, the fact that members of the new poor were more likely than the 
structurally poor to join others to confront their impoverishment during the 
2002 economic crisis indicates that new poverty was no longer “hidden,” as was 
observed in the 1990s, due to the shame of openly manifesting one’s struggling 
fi nancial circumstances (Minujín, Beccaria, and Bustelo 1993). It also gives cre-
dence to Mazzoni’s (2007) proposition that many came to understand that they 
were part of a social stratum that was “in descent” and that working collectively 
with others who were encountering the same experience was an important way 
to improve their in-group’s situation. The result potentially offers support to the 
“politicized collective identity pathway” to social movement participation (Tajfel 
Figure 1 Forms of organization among the Argentine new poor in 2002
Frequency of Response  Site of Action      Orientation   Action 
                           
Most Common        Individual     Self-help 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Least Common           Collective       Protest 
       
        Source: World Bank ISCA Survey 
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and Turner 1986) but should be investigated further as it cannot be decisively 
proven here.
Attitudes, Opportunities, and Infl uences That Informed New-Poor Group Behavior
Latinobarómetro data suggests that changing macroeconomic and political 
contexts expanded the spaces available for newly poor Argentines to resist their 
fate collectively or through protest in 2002 compared to 1995, and also infl uenced 
their attitudes and how they perceived their pauperization.
New-poor subjectivities: From self-blame in the 1990s to the legitimacy crisis / The re-
sults seem to confi rm that during the 1990s newly poor Argentines were more 
likely to accept the narrative that their hardship was due to their own personal de-
fi ciencies, but by 2002 many had profoundly reassessed the causes of their plight. 
Table 3 indicates that when posed with the question of who was to blame for the 
crisis that led to their impoverishment in 2002, 70 percent concluded that respon-
sibility lay with their government, while a large proportion also understood their 
fall to be grounded in the actions of the IMF (38 percent), banks (21 percent), or 
economic processes such as globalization (26 percent). Less than a fi fth saw them-
selves as at fault as individuals in any way. Multiple answers were permitted, so a 
minority may have simultaneously blamed themselves and apportioned respon-
sibility to structural or institutional causes. However, the loss of faith in their 
elected leaders between 1995 and 2002 is demonstrated by the fact that the pro-
portion that held “no confi dence” in the government to run their affairs climbed 
sharply from 49 percent to 82 percent (p = .00). Impoverishment was increasingly 
understood as a political problem that needed to be contested through protest 
rather than simply through private coping strategies.
Between 1995 and 2002, newly poor citizens were not simply disillusioned 
with the government, but their trust in each of Argentina’s key institutions, espe-
cially those that purportedly held a representative function (government, parlia-
ment, political parties, and trade unions), dramatically collapsed (see fi gure 2). 
This supports assertions that a crisis of legitimacy existed in Argentina at the 
time, especially among those in the middle class who had suffered fi nancially. 
Notably, their confi dence in these institutions had not recovered by 2005 in spite 
Table 3 Who the new poor blamed for the economic crisis in 2002
Government’s economic policy 70%
International Monetary Fund 38%
Globalization 26%
Banks 21%
Lack of domestic production 20%
Lack of individual enterprise 18%
Lack of investment 15%
World Trade Organization 7%
Source: Latinobarómetro
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of the strong macroeconomic recovery. At least among the new poor, an under-
lying crisis of representation seems to have endured for several years.
Economic context and reduced political tolerance of material hardship / In 1995, 77 per-
cent of the new poor believed that the country’s economic problems were either 
being solved or would be solved given more time. Yet as table 3 indicates, by 2002, 
when GDP had shrunk by 20 percent in the previous two years (INDEC 2003), 
almost the same proportion (70 percent) actually blamed their government’s eco-
nomic policies for having caused the crisis. The volatility of the era, the sovereign 
debt default, and policy mistakes in the latter period that were evident from the 
breakdown of Convertibility and the corralito made it appear that the govern-
ment had lost control of the economy. The macroeconomic situation therefore 
seems to have been an important factor in how the Argentine new poor decided to 
resist their plight. This confi rms Powers’s (1999) assertion that when Argentines 
believed Menem’s government was managing the economy well in the 1990s, they 
were prepared to politically tolerate high personal economic costs and tended to 
blame themselves for their own misfortunes. Yet when they felt that their political 
leaders had displayed economic incompetence (in 2002), this politicized the way 
that they viewed their circumstances, and they relinquished personal responsi-
bility for it. This fomented political opposition and made protest responses more 
likely.
Undermined self-help opportunities but increased spaces for collective protest / The re-
sults also indicate that a decision to join collective protests may have become more 
appealing in 2002 because the relative gravity of the economic crisis meant that 
the new poor were denied opportunities to pursue the same individual self-help 
strategies that had remained open to them in the previous decade. In the 1990s, 
obtaining bank loans to start businesses, using credit cards, and tapping savings 
were among the coping strategies that were easily enacted to maintain standards 
of living. Such liquidity was simply not available after Argentina’s sovereign debt 
default in December 2001. Further, INDEC’s unemployment fi gures cited earlier 
Figure 2 Confi dence in Argentina’s institutions among the new poor, 1995–2005. Data from 
Latinobarómetro.
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highlight the shrinking spaces for individual self-help in the labor market be-
tween the 1990s and 2002 (especially skilled jobs, in which the new poor tended to 
be employed). With so few qualifi ed jobs available, it meant that elements of their 
human capital, such as their superior qualifi cations and skills, counted for little. 
During the 2002 crisis, many perceived the eroding value of their possession of 
key assets, which would normally have helped them to achieve upward mobility. 
Consequently, the proportion who believed that “working hard leads to success” 
fell signifi cantly from 60 percent in 1995 to 45 percent by 2002 (p = .01).
The value of social capital also depreciated during the 2002 crisis. Networks 
of well-connected and affl uent professional acquaintances, which the new-poor 
citizens had previously benefi ted from to leverage employment, promotions, 
and business recommendations, dried up (Ozarow 2008). On the supply side this 
was because these networks were often bereft of resources themselves (for ex-
ample because of the sheer scale of pauperization, or because very few small and 
 medium-sized businesses were fi nancially able to recruit new staff), while on the 
demand side, some newly poor Argentines felt too embarrassed to admit their 
dramatic descent and ask for assistance. Thus despite the value of their social 
capital during times of macroeconomic stability, in the context of crisis it became 
a superfl uous resource (Kessler and Di Virgilio 2008). Accordingly, those who be-
lieved that “success in life depends on who you know” dwindled from 75 percent 
in 1995 to 60 percent in 2002 (p = .01). With ever fewer believing it was possible to 
recoup their lost socioeconomic status through their own efforts or connections, 
political tolerance of hardship weakened and protest was increasingly favored.
Finally, the results confi rmed that individuals tended to discredit traditional 
electoral spaces (individual protest) to contest their condition during the crisis. In 
1995, the belief that “the way you vote can change things” was strongly supported 
(by 73 percent of the new poor), and 81 percent also stated that they would “vote 
for an opposition party.” By the time of the voto bronca in the October 2001 legisla-
tive elections, however, widespread disillusionment with the political class led 
citizens to vest more faith in alternative forms of grassroots participatory democ-
racy like the neighborhood assemblies (Svampa 2006).8
Infl uences on Individual Action
Relative hardship stimulates protest but absolute hardship prompts self-help / Neither 
the experience of becoming poor nor the extent of absolute material deprivation 
had a generative impact on the decision to engage in collective protest. Those who 
fell slightly below the poverty line were just as likely to join collective protests 
as more profoundly (and newly) impoverished Argentines. However, those who 
ended up with lower incomes were inclined to pursue a wider range (between 
three and eleven) of different economic coping strategies. Prior work on the new 
poor suggests that at lower depths of poverty, many of the taboos that prevent 
certain forms of self-help action by the new poor—such as hostility to the idea of 
8. In the voto bronca, half of the electorate either spoiled their ballot papers or abstained, despite the 
legal obligation to vote.
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accepting charity and state welfare (Aguirre 2008), or embarrassment over bor-
rowing money from acquaintances (Minujín, Beccaria, and Bustelo 1993)—are 
overcome as the need for sheer survival takes precedence. The survey results 
show that those in greater depths of poverty also tended to pursue more collec-
tive self- improvement actions. In the context of a macroeconomic crisis where few 
skilled jobs were available, collective actions like barter clubs (especially when 
understood as a substitute form of work; Bombal and Luzzi 2006) or worker-
 recovered companies and cooperatives were attractive for those with the lowest 
incomes (usually the unemployed or underemployed), because they provided 
both a means of subsistence and a sense of self-worth and permitted a recovery of 
professional identities (Paiva 2004).
The degree of income fall (how suddenly impoverishment arose) was found 
to have infl uenced the decision to join the protests. In those households with no 
income loss (income which slipped below the poverty line solely due to infl ation), 
16 percent subsequently joined a protest; however among those who lost between 
half and all of their income, this rose signifi cantly to 28 percent (p = .04). Con-
clusive fi ndings cannot be drawn due to the low percentage difference between 
them, but this result supports the theoretical implication that responses seem to 
adopt the form of “demand-making” through protest when income losses tangi-
bly affect quality of life.
Biographical histories: The activist or nonactivist dichotomy / Newly impoverished 
citizens in 2002 were far more likely to have joined a protest if they had a prior 
history of involvement in communal organizations (in its broadest sense, encom-
passing political parties, the church, NGOs, trade unions, sports clubs, etc.). Fifty-
four percent of the new poor with such backgrounds did so, compared to just 
19 percent of those without (p = .00). This builds on previous empirical work 
that demonstrates the causal link between civic and political engagement in Latin 
America (Klesner 2007). Such affi liations aided exposure to social networks that 
possibly raised awareness about the available opportunities to take part in collec-
tive actions.
Evidence also shows that pauperization generally invoked two polarized sets 
of responses, with participants either actively engaging in both collective protest 
and a wide variety of self-improvement strategies (named the “activists” here), or 
minimizing their self-help strategies while refraining from protests altogether 
(“nonactivists”). Of those who pursued a low range of self-help strategies (fewer 
than three), only 13 percent took part in collective protests, yet among those who 
pursued a wide range, the proportion who also engaged in collective protests 
more than doubled to 31 percent (p = .00). Moreover, the results show that despite 
the extra energies that they expended in both types of activity, the activists also 
dedicated longer hours to paid employment.
Such a polarization might be explained by the fact that during periods of polit-
ical and economic turmoil, the traumatic experience of sudden pauperization has 
been found to induce mental paralysis and a denial of one’s reality (Plotkin 2003) 
or demoralization (which extinguishes the desire to resist their plight) among 
those with such cognitive predispositions, thus explaining the intransigence of 
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those in the nonactivist group. However, for others, such experiences can instead 
ignite anger and activism (Oskarson 2010), invigorating a desire to ameliorate 
their household’s circumstances through self-help while also contesting them 
through protest. It was also found that a signifi cant minority tended to engage in 
both collective self-help activities and collective protest. This was perhaps due to 
the fact that specifi c collective protests or actions of economic solidarity acted as 
sites of awareness raising and social networking during the crisis, where parallel 
collective actions could be actively or casually promoted to participants (Paiva 
2004; Svampa and Corral 2006). This meant that involvement in one collective 
activity often led to participation in another.
Position within the labor market: Work and politicization / One of the most intrigu-
ing results that this study uncovered was the politicizing impact that spending 
time at work tended to have on responses to pauperization. As fi gure 3 illustrates, 
newly poor Argentines who dedicated longer hours to paid work demonstrated 
a far greater propensity to join the protest movement. In new-poor households 
where no one was employed (with zero average working hours), Argentines were 
three times more likely to enact higher ranges of self-help strategies rather than 
protest responses. However, this ratio decreased to a ratio of 2:1 when house-
hold members were working 1–20 hours per week, 1.5:1 at 21–40 hours, and then 
among those who worked the longest hours (41–60 hours), a protest response 
became equally likely. At fi rst sight this seems surprising because it refutes the 
rational-choice assumption that working more results in less spare time avail-
able to engage in protest activities. Also, as a one-way ANOVA test proved, in 
those households where longer hours were worked, average per capita incomes 
were higher, therefore members of these households should theoretically have 
had fewer economic grievances.
I propose three alternative hypotheses to explain this relationship between 
work and politicization. First, those who worked hardest may have felt espe-
cially aggrieved by their impoverishment, because the meritocratic ideals that 
are central to the middle-class Argentine belief system (Armony and Armony 
2005) would have been breached more openly. Those who dedicated consider-
able efforts to striving for self-improvement through their own labor may be less 
inclined to blame themselves for their hardship and instead construe their fate 
as a political problem. The second possibility is that spending more time in the 
presence of work colleagues may have increased their exposure to others with 
similar grievances. The workplace thus may have acted as an important site of 
social interaction that cultivated formation of collective grievances and identity. 
Third, those working longer hours may have been more motivated to protest to 
defend their interests because they risked forfeiting higher levels of income than 
those working (and earning) less, if the crisis remained unresolved.
Physical proximity to sites of collective action / Although among the general survey 
universe, citizens were signifi cantly more likely to take part in collective protests 
if they lived in the city of Buenos Aires (31 percent) compared to Buenos Aires 
Province (21 percent) or Argentina’s remaining provinces (21 percent; p = .00), 
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perhaps surprisingly, no signifi cant difference was identifi ed among the new 
poor. Argentines’ decisions about whether to resist their impoverishment indi-
vidually or collectively were therefore not infl uenced by whether such opportuni-
ties physically existed within their province.
Comparing Responses of New Poor and Structural Poor: Utilizing Superior 
Capital Assets as a New-Poor Survival Strategy
Only 28 percent of the new poor saw their incomes diminish below the dollar-
a-day marker of absolute poverty, compared to 55 percent of the structurally poor 
(p = .00). We can deduce from this that as well- educated, often home-owning citi-
zens with managerial or professional employment experience, their ability to ex-
ploit their superior human, fi nancial, physical, and social capital generally helped 
the new poor to avoid indigence during the crisis.
Table 4 compares levels of engagement in active self-help strategies between 
the newly and the structurally poor. Although the new-poor employment rate 
(83 percent) was not signifi cantly different from that of the structural poor 
(77 percent), the new poor’s average waged income was 17 percent higher, in itself 
probably largely due to their superior human capital. The results also illustrate 
that they were statistically signifi cantly more likely to gain access to credit, bank 
loans, rental earnings, and savings, or to sell/pawn assets as part of their coping 
strategies (although the evidence is not resounding due to the weak power of 
the test). The new poor’s higher home ownership, salaries, formal employment, 
and professional networks apparently also gave them advantages in seeking ad-
ditional fi nancial capital to survive.
Figure 3 Working hours and responses to impoverishment in Argentina, 2002. Data from 
World Bank ISCA Survey, 2002.
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Interestingly, the results show that social networking strategies were under-
taken by twice as many structurally poor (32 percent) as new poor (17 percent). 
Although this might seem unexpected because those in the impoverished middle 
class were much better connected to networks of professionals and those with 
status or fi nancial resources, it seems to support evidence described earlier that 
many were simply too ashamed to approach circles of middle-class friends and 
acquaintances for help following impoverishment, or that the kinds of favors that 
they could offer possessed little currency in a situation of deep economic crisis 
and pauperization. Similarly, it was found that only 5 percent of the new poor 
were enrolled in state welfare programs, as compared to 22 percent of the struc-
tural poor. ISCA data revealed a reluctance to apply for unemployment benefi ts 
(Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar) among the new poor, with a quarter of those who 
were eligible refusing to register.
Such ambivalence toward state aid often resulted from a desire to maintain 
their middle-class identity, which led the new poor to prefer strategies that were 
believed to symbolize the middle-class values of self-suffi ciency and individual 
enterprise (Svampa 2005). The survey also indicated that the new poor (29 percent) 
were signifi cantly more likely to become self-employed than the structural poor 
(13 percent), substantiating several qualitative sources that point to the symbolic 
importance that the new poor gave to (often informally) establishing a microen-
terprise as a response to unemployment in light of the scarce opportunities for 
labor market reintegration during 2002. This was often the only option available 
to newly poor Argentines in order to avoid the horrifying prospect of having no 
work, something which was viewed as synonymous with being “outside the sys-
tem” in the middle-class psyche. It was also comparatively easier for them to do 
so because unlike many of the structurally poor, they often possessed the neces-
sary physical capital such as telephones, personal computers, and homes, as well 
as the relevant employment experience and social networks for them to fl ourish 
(Bayón 2003).
Table 4 N ew and structurally poor households’ self-help strategies (June–November 2002)
New poor % Structural poor %
Work 83 77
Social networks (gifts/loans from outside 
 household)
17 32*
Financial capital (credit card/bank loan/
 savings/sell assets)
16** 8
Advanced payments 10 6
State aid (nonpension benefi ts) 5 22*
Barter 3 4
Cartoneros 0 4
Source: Data from World Bank ISCA Survey, 2002
Note: Chi-square statistic identifi es a signifi cant difference between new and structural poor at 
*0.01 and **0.1 levels.
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CONCLUSIONS
This article has shown that although Argentines overwhelmingly favored the 
pursuit of individual self-improvement actions when resisting impoverishment 
during the economic crisis in 2002, almost a third also pursued collective actions 
during the six-month period under scrutiny, including one in fi ve who engaged 
in collective protests.
Amid a catastrophic macroeconomic climate, mass pauperization, and a cri-
sis of political legitimacy, the relative tolerance displayed by the new poor who 
faced hardship in the 1990s rapidly dissipated. Rather than internalizing the 
causes of descent, by 2002 citizens increasingly ascribed it to structural processes 
and specifi c political and fi nancial institutions. The resulting transformation in 
subjectivities expanded opportunities for collective identity formation and po-
liticization, which promptly translated into heightened involvement in collective 
action.
While the experience of having become poor in itself had no effect on whether 
Argentines decided to protest, they were more likely to do so if they experienced 
deeper and more sudden fi nancial losses, if their privations became more discern-
ible in daily life, if they had histories of involvement in collective organizations, or 
if they worked longer hours. No evidence was found that geographical proximity 
to sites of collective action infl uenced such decisions. Those with lower absolute 
household income levels tended to engage more in self-improvement strategies.
The research also revealed that the new poor’s possession of superior human 
and physical capital aided the pursuit of certain private coping strategies (espe-
cially self-employment), relative to their structurally poor compatriots. Elements 
of their more sophisticated cultural and political capital as well as an unyielding 
desire to uphold their middle-class identities also infl uenced both the decision to 
join protests and which particular protest forms were favored.
However, an important caveat must be added to these results. Some of the 
limitations of using closed secondary data and quantitative sources as the basis 
for explanations of new-poor behavior have been noted. For example the ISCA 
Survey’s emphasis on income as a central indicator of household well-being and 
behavioral motivation—rather than feelings of “love,” “future prospects,” “soli-
darity,” or other categories that newly poor Argentines may have expressed—
limit the explanatory power of this research. This article may prove most useful 
as a framework for needed additional qualitative research to build on previous 
studies, so that a more comprehensive understanding about political responses to 
new impoverishment can be developed.
Other themes emerging from this research that require further investigation 
include the question of why two-thirds of the Argentine new poor did not engage 
in any collective actions despite the climate of economic chaos and social unrest 
in 2002. Understanding political docility during times of economic crises is an 
under-researched issue, despite being equally as important for social movement 
theorists as explaining political mobilization. The association between the pro-
pensity to protest and time spent in the workplace raises intriguing questions 
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about how the infringement of middle-class values such as meritocracy and self-
suffi ciency can sow the seeds of political resistance.
In contrast to the fi rst wave of new poor, whose collective resistance to impov-
erishment was subdued by the threat of military repression until 1983, or the sec-
ond wave, which fell victim to consumerist co-optation under Convertibility be-
tween 1992 and 2001, the third wave of new poor was liberated from such modes 
of hegemonic domination. This opened up opportunities to engage in collective 
actions in 2002 that had not previously existed.
The “pink tide” that has been the defi ning feature of Latin America’s political 
landscape in the past decade has left in its wake highly politicized societies that 
display greater levels of social mobilization than at any point since the 1970s. The 
next time Latin America experiences a region-wide economic crisis, the question 
of whether those from its middle class who become poor opt for collective protest 
rather than simply private coping strategies will carry far more signifi cance than 
it has for many decades.
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